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FIGHTING THE DEVIL WE DON'T KNOW: KANSAS
v. HENDRICKS, A CASE STUDY EXPLORING THE
CIVILIZATION OF CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND
ITS INEFFECTIVENESS IN PREVENTING CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE
In 1984, a jury convicted Leroy Hendricks of taking "indecent
liberties" with two children.1 He served all but a few months of
his sentence and was scheduled to be released to a halfway
house when the Kansas legislature promulgated the Sexually
Violent Predator Act ("Act"). 2 The Act provided for "a civil com-
mitment procedure for the long-term care and treatment of the
sexually violent predator."3 Hendricks objected to the Act on con-
stitutional grounds, arguing that it violated the Double Jeopardy
and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the U.S. Constitution, as well as
his right to due process.4 Although the Kansas Supreme Court
agreed that the Act violated Hendricks's right to due process,
5
the U.S. Supreme Court did not. In Kansas v. Hendricks, the
Court held that because "the Act does not establish criminal pro-
ceedings and... involuntary confinement pursuant to the Act is
not punitive," it did not violate the Constitution.6
The Court's ruling had the effect of incarcerating an admitted
pedophile indefinitely. Society's instinctive reaction might be
one of intense satisfaction that the Court protected children by
permitting a legislature to banish those who prey upon them. In
the broader context, however, the analytical calisthenics that the
Court performed to obtain that result have sobering implica-
tions. By defining the Act as civil in nature, the Court was able
1. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 353-54 (1997).
2. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a17 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
3. Id. § 59-29a01.
4. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356.
5. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 138 (Kan. 1996), rev'd, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
6. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369.
7. See id. at 363-64.
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to circumvent the constitutional protections the founding fathers
granted to criminal defendants.' The Court also permitted the
Kansas legislature to redefine the terms of permissible "involun-
tary confinement" to deny sexual offenders what few "civil"
protections existed.9 Hendricks laid the framework for states to
deprive sexual offenders of individual liberty by mere legislative
action. By using a faulty analytical basis and then refusing to
narrow its holding to child molesters, or even to sexual offend-
ers, the Court opened the door for state legislatures to imprison
"undesirables" without judicial impediment.10
Arguably, the deprivation of constitutional rights to those who
commit child sexual abuse is a small price to pay to assure the
safety of children.'1 On an ideological level, however, the unilat-
eral deprivation of constitutional protections is objectionable.
8. Courts have interpreted the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses to
apply only to criminal acts. See id. at 369-70. The Hendricks Court specifically noted:
[I]n Baxstrom v. Herold, we expressly recognized that civil commitment
could follow the expiration of a prison term without offending double
jeopardy principles.... The Ex Post Facto Clause, which "forbids the
application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummat-
ed" has been interpreted to pertain exclusively to penal statutes.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 519 U.S.
499, 505 (1995)).
The Supreme Court has applied this analysis in many different contexts over
the last decade, generally to the detriment of the individual. See, e.g., United States
v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 274, 277 (1996) (finding that the Double Jeopardy Clause
was not invoked because the issue was civil in rem forfeiture); Witte v. United
States, 515 U.S. 389, 396 (1995) (holding that double jeopardy is a prohibition
against "punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally, for the
same offense' (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 399 (1938) (emphasis added));
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987) (stating that the Bail Reform Act
of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3141 (1994), was "regulatory in nature, and [did] not constitute
punishment before trial in violation of the Due Process Clause").
9. See infra text accompanying note 246.
10. Immediately following the decision in Hendricks, state legislatures across the
country announced plans to implement similar statutes. See, e.g., Ceci Connolly,
Some States Racing to Grasp Baton of Power Passed by High Court, WASH. POST,
June 29, 1997, at A16 (noting passage of a violent sexual predator bill by the New
York Senate two days after the Supreme Court released the Hendricks decision).
11. Some outraged victims of violent crime protest that courts should not even
consider the attackers' constitutional protections on the theory that those attackers
have forfeited their rights as a result of their heinous acts. See, e.g., DAVID C. AN-
DERSON, CRIME AND THE POLITICS OF HYSTERIA 172-73 (1995) (relating victims' and
family members' responses to the punishment of those responsible for their loss).
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The Constitution strives to "establish Justice... and secure the
Blessings of Liberty" to "We the People."12 Permitting legislators
to pick and choose to whom constitutional protections may apply
places our entire judicial system on an insecure foundation."3 On
a practical level, by upholding the Act, the Supreme Court
squandered the opportunity to force lawmakers to confront the
horrific realities of child sexual abuse and target its most fre-
quent perpetrators. 14
Despite the onslaught of publicity surrounding crimes commit-
ted by sexually violent strangers, the devastating truth is that
most child sexual abuse is committed by a relative or friend of
the victim. 5 The incarceration of a handful of individuals is in-
sufficient to address the widespread problem of sexual abuse. 6
Legislators may propose and enact sexually violent predator
statues and claim to solve the problem, yet the implementation
of such laws protects but a small minority of victims. By assum-
ing that incarceration is the appropriate remedy, lawmakers and
the Supreme Court, which endorsed the legislation, ignore the
need to delve deeper into the "silent epidemic" of the sexual
abuse problem in the United States and to think creatively
about methods of prevention.17
The first section of this Note examines the traditional distinc-
tions between "civil" and "criminal" detention and discusses the
purposes and protections provided to individuals subject to each
12. U.S. CONST. preamble.
13. Arguments that constitutional rights are in fact selectively protected, particu-
larly in a racial context, are beyond the scope of this Note. For an excellent presen-
tation of that argument, see Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51
VAND. L. REV. 333 (1998).
14. See infra notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
15. See Alan R. Kabat, Note, Scarlet Letter Sex Offender Databases and Commu-
nity Notification, 35 AM. CRBI. L. REV. 333, 339 (1998).
16. From the date of the Act's promulgation in May 1994, until November 1997,
approximately 800 convicted sex offenders were evaluated under the Act's provisions.
Only 12 (1.5%) were labeled "sexually violent predators" and subject to longer peri-
ods of incarceration. See Carla J. Stovall, The Privilege of Arguing Before the United
States Supreme Court, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 13 (1997).
17. See Robert E. Freeman-Longo, Reducing Sexual Abuse in America: Legislating
Tougher Laws or Public Education and Prevention, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON ClUM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 303, 303 (1997); see also infra notes 176-201 and accompanying text
(discussing the largely underreported problem of child sexual abuse in America).
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type of imprisonment. The second section analyzes the Supreme
Court's decision in Hendricks, including its acceptance of the
classification of Leroy Hendricks as a "predator," and its com-
plete deference to the Kansas legislature.'" The third section
considers possible reasons for the Court's apparent willingness
to abandon constitutional protections in certain areas. This Note
concludes with a discussion of the implications and ramifications
of the Hendricks decision on the problem of child sexual abuse.
INVOLUNTARY CONFINEMENT: PURPOSE, HISTORY, AND THE
DISTINCTION BETWEEN CIvILITY AND CRIMINALITY
The Preamble of the Constitution insists that a major goal of
the document is to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves
and our Posterity." 9 The Constitution ensures that liberty ap-
plies not only to society in general, but also to the rights of indi-
viduals to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion. °
This does not mean, however, that American citizens live free
from any and all restrictions: "There are manifold restraints to
which every person is necessarily subject for the common good.
On any other basis organized society could not exist with safety
to its members." 2' A balance exists between individual indepen-
dence and societal benefits.
Until recently, the detention of individuals clearly had been
categorized as either "involuntary civil confinement" or "criminal
punishment."22 Involuntary civil commitment traditionally relat-
ed only to individuals who were mentally ill, while government
reserved criminal punishment for prisoners as retribution for
their crimes against society. This section will distinguish be-
tween the two types of detainment and then explain how the
Court obliterated those differences in Hendricks.
18. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 355, 358-59 (1997).
19. U.S. CONST. preamble.
20. This concept arises most notably in the Fourth Amendment, which ensures
"It]he right of the people to be secure in their persons .. . against unreason-
able . . . seizures." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
21. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905).
22. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979) (explaining the ratio-
nale for applying different standards of proof for involuntary civil commitment and
criminal confinement).
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Involuntary Civil Confinement
The American Bar Association has defined involuntary civil
commitment as "the process by which mentally ill individuals
who are dangerous to themselves [or to] others ... are forced to
receive mental health care, usually in an inpatient facility."
23
Unlike criminal incarceration, involuntary civil commitment
may continue for an indefinite duration.' Individuals who are
involuntarily confined are entitled to periodic review of their
condition.25 When they are deemed to have "recovered," they are
released.2 6 These distinctions are consistent with the traditional
primary purposes of involuntary civil commitment: "treatment
and protective isolation of the individual."
21
Prior to Hendricks, involuntary civil confinement was consti-
tutional only if a state could prove by clear and convincing evi-
dence21 that an individual was: (1) mentally ill and (2) danger-
ous, either to the individual himself or to society at large.29 Nei-
ther element alone was sufficient to warrant detention.30 Civil
commitment was justified under the state's parens patriae pow-
er.3 ' If an individual was incompetent, the state had a duty to
provide for his care, and the focus of his detainment was treat-
23. LINDSAY G. ARTHUR ET AL., INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMI4TMENT: A MANUAL FOR
LAWYERS AND JUDGES 3 (Jeanne A. Dooley & John W. Parry eds., 1988).
24. See, e.g., State v. Turner, 556 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1977) (articulating a mentally
ill patient's rights with respect to involuntary civil commitment under Texas law).
25. See id. at 566.
26. See ARTHUR ET AL., supra note 23, at 58. But see infra note 240 (noting
health care professionals' doubt that a psychiatrist would certify that a "sexually vio-
lent predator" could be released into the community).
27. ARTHUR ET AL., supra note 23, at 3.
28. See id.; see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 418 (1979) (rejecting both
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" and "preponderance of the evidence" standards for
proving the need for involuntary commitment of an individual). The Addington Court
was unwilling to adopt the strict "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard "in civil com-
mitment proceedings because, given the uncertainties of psychiatric diagnosis, it may
impose a burden the state cannot meet and thereby erect an unreasonable barrier to
needed medical treatment." Id. at 432. It is likely that similar thinking guided the
Hendricks majority as it considered whether to require a finding of "mental illness"
before an individual could be involuntarily committed. See infra notes 109-10 and ac-
companying text.
29. See ARTHUR ET AL., supra note 23, at 3.
30. See id.
31. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 426.
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ment."2 If an individual was not mentally ill, a state's civil de-
tention of such an individual violated due process.33
Largely because "psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently
on what constitutes mental illness,"34 the Court has utilized a
plethora of words to describe a psychiatric condition that does
not appear to be "normal," yet fails to reach the heights of "men-
tal illness." 5 Prior to Hendricks, it was unclear whether an indi-
vidual's condition had to be diagnosed as a mental disease, or
whether something less was sufficient to satisfy the threshold
issue.36
The state also had to prove that the individual posed a danger
to himself or to others. 37 Before Hendricks, proof of dangerous-
ness was a considerable burden, because it required the state to
establish a nexus between a finding of mental illness and the in-
dividual's dangerousness without relying solely upon evidence of
the individual's past behavior.31 Permissible factors to be consid-
32. See id.
33. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1992).
34. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985).
35. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 314-15 (1993) (using the classification
"mentally retarded"); Addington, 441 U.S. at 425 (characterizing the respondent as
'emotionally disturbed"); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 732, 737 (1972) (referring
to "incompetency" and "insanity").
36. Hendricks argued that a diagnosis of "mental illness" was required before the
State could commit him. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997). He ar-
gued further that a judicial determination of "mental abnormality" was insufficient to
prompt commitment because it was a term created by legislators and did not carry
any meaning within the psychiatric community. See id. at 359; see also Transcript of
Oral Argument, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (No. 95-9075), available in
1996 WL 721073, at *48-51 (Dec. 10, 1996) [hereinafter Transcript] (discussing the
terminology and requirements for a finding of mental illness).
37. See ARTHUR ET AL., supra note 23, at 11.
38. See id. at 11-12. Hendricks explicitly permitted a court to base its finding of
the likelihood of future dangerousness on evidence of the individual's past behavior.
See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357-58. The Act applies only to individuals who have
been charged with or convicted of violent sexual crimes, although it does require a
finding that the individual "suffers from a mental abnormality . . . which makes the
person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual violence." KAN. STAT. ANN. §
59-29a02(a) (Supp. 1997). This apparent limitation is a fallacy, however, and does
not screen anyone who had committed a sexual crime in the past from a determi-
nation of future dangerousness. As noted by the psychologist who served as the
State's primary witness on the issue before the trial court, the "definition [of mental
abnormality] is circular in that certain behavior defines the condition which is used
to predict the behavior." In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 138 (Kan. 1996), rev'd, 521
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ered in the evaluation of a person's dangerousness included the
"imminence, likelihood, [and] severity of the threat,"39 and "the
individual's [personal] history, his... environment and demo-
graphic factors."4 °
In an attempt to deal with the unique problems presented by
pedophilia,41 the Hendricks Court expanded the standard for in-
voluntary civil commitment and made it easier for the state to
meet the burden of proof required to satisfy that standard. In
Hendricks, the Court confronted one state legislature's attempt
to incorporate repeat sexual offenders into the state's system of
involuntary civil commitment by making it applicable to those
who suffer from a "mental abnormality."42 Classifying sexual
offenders in general, and pedophiles in particular, is difficult
because the psychiatric community lacks consensus on whether
these individuals are afflicted with a "mental illness."43 Proving
that an individual is a pedophile therefore does not necessarily
satisfy the threshold requirement for traditional involuntary
civil confinement. The Kansas legislature attempted to bypass
the "mental illness" debate by using the phrase "mental abnor-
mality."' The Hendricks Court held that it was unnecessary to
establish "mental illness" per se to satisfy due process.45 "We
have never required State legislatures to adopt any particular
U.S. 346 (1997).
39. ARTHUR ET AL., supra note 23, at 11-12.
40. Id. at 54.
41. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
42. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (Supp. 1997).
43. The psychologist who testified for the State at the jury trial held to determine
whether Hendricks qualified as a "sexually violent predator" acknowledged that "pe-
dophilia in and of itself is not considered to be a personality disorder." Hendricks,
912 P.2d at 131; see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 109 (1992) (stating that
courts should defer to the legislature in the psychological arena because of the "'un-
certainty of diagnosis in this field and the tentativeness of professional judgment"
(quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 365 n.13 (1983))).
44. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358-59 (1997).
45. See id. Eight of the nine justices determined that such a diagnosis was unnec-
essary. See id. at 348; id. at 373-74 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsberg did not
join in Part I of the dissent, which agreed with the majority opinion that the Act's
"definition of 'mental abnormality' satisfies the 'substantive' requirements of the Due
Process Clause." Id. at 373 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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nomenclature in drafting civil commitment statutes."46 The
Court stated that a "mental abnormality" was an "additional fac-
tor" that, when combined with a finding of "dangerousness," was
sufficient to justify involuntary civil commitment.47
Criminal Punishment
Philosophers continually have debated the purpose and moral-
ity of inflicting punishment upon individuals.48 Most generally,
punishment is defined as the intentional imposition of some-
thing presumed to be odious to the recipient, by a group deemed
by the community as possessing the authority to mete out and
enforce the sentence.49 The individual's voluntary violation of the
social code serves as the justification for the sentence.5" Addi-
tionally, there is a general notion that the punishment should fit
the crime.5 This concept protects the accused from unduly harsh
punishment and ensures that the sentence imposed by the soci-
etal authority accurately reflects the individual's culpability.
52
As noted by the Hendricks Court, retribution and deterrence
are the primary purposes of punishment." Retribution is the
theory of "just deserts"-that an individual who breaks society's
code deserves to be penalized.54 Deterrence, the idea that pun-
ishing offenders theoretically prevents others from similarly
46. Id. at 359.
47. Id. at 358.
48. See generally NIGEL WALKER, WHY PUNISH? (1991) (providing an excellent
overview of the debate over the infliction of punishment from its origins to the pres-
ent).
49. See id. at 1-2.
50. See id. at 2-3; see also Michael Corrado, Punishment, Quarantine, and Preven-
tive Detention, 15 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 3-4 (1996) (generalizing that punishment is
a reasonable response to crime).
51. See CICERO, DE OFFICIIS bk. I, ch. XXVI (John Higgenbotham trans., Univ. of
Cal. Press 1967) (n.d.) ("One should also ensure that the penalty is not out of pro-
portion to the crime."). This idea is crystallized in our federal law through the
Constitution's protection against "cruel and unusual punishments." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
52. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1955) (defining culpability and pro-
viding a rationale for the imposition of criminal liability).
53. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361-62 (1997).
54. See WALKER, supra note 48, at 9 (addressing the theory of retributivism).
PREVENTING CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
breaking the law,55 is an ancient concept, dating back to the ori-
gins of criminal law.56
Another significant purpose of the infliction of punishment is
to fulfill public expectations.57 "'[Slociety, through the courts,
must show its abhorrence of particular types of crime ....
Some critics argue that this aspect has become disproportion-
ately important in recent years, to the detriment of calculated
reasoning.59 Regardless of whether the criticism is accurate, it is
clear that the need to give the appearance of responding to pub-
lic concerns regarding crime plays a significant role in the draft-
ing of criminal law.
The Distinction Between Involuntary Civil Commitment and
Criminal Punishment, and its Role in Hendricks
Historically, the state has used two reasons to justify involun-
tary civil confinement. First, detention and treatment may pre-
vent an offender whose niental illness renders him dangerous
from committing future bad acts.6 ° Alternatively, confinement
may be retaliatory, and justified as a consequence of the person's
prior bad acts.6 ' Involuntary civil commitment thus centers on
55. See PHILLIP MONTAGUE, PUNISHMENT AS SOcIETAL-DEFENSE 6 (1995).
56. See ARTHUR L. STINCHCOMBE ET AL., CRIME AND PUNISHMENT-CHANGING AT-
TITUDES IN AMERICA 79 (1980).
57. See WALKER, supra note 48, at 22.
58. Id. (quoting an English case, R. v. Sargeant, 60 Crim. App. 74, 77 (1974)).
59. See, e.g., John Q. Barrett, Death for Child Rapists May Not Save Children,
NATL L.J., Aug. 18, 1997, at A21. Barrett's article discusses the Supreme Court's
refusal to grant certiorari to a case challenging a Louisiana statute that permitted
the use of capital punishment for rapists of children under the age of 12. See
Bethley v. Louisiana, 520 U.S. 1259 (1997). Barrett noted that "death penalty liti-
gation is an ordeal that could traumatize child victims," suggested that perpetrators
known to the victims could use the potential for death as a tool to persuade the
victim to keep the abuse a secret, and cautioned that "[wie need to think about all
this before a legislative rush to protect children swamps careful consideration."
Barrett, supra, at A21; see also ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 180-81 (evaluating the
furlough program that was at the core of the Willie Horton furor during the 1988
presidential campaign, and arguing that "eliminating the chance for rare replays of
the Horton case would make no measurable contribution to overall crime reduction.
But this was . . .an obscure point.").
60. See generally MONTAGUE, supra note 55, at 5 (discussing familiar justifications
for punishment).
61. See id.
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the individual's well-being and state of mind; criminal punish-
ment, on the other hand, focuses on society by requiring the
convicted felon to "pay" for his transgression, by securing the
felon so he can no longer threaten the community, and by send-
ing a message to other individuals who contemplate breaking
the law.62 The Court's decision in Hendricks blurred the tradi-
tional distinction between the two permissible types of involun-
tary incarceration.63
The State confined Hendricks, but did not diagnose him with
a mental illness or afford him treatment.64 Consideration of his
potential dangerousness seemed to be the paramount, and per-
haps the only, issue that concerned the majority of the Court.65
Under traditional analysis, therefore, Hendricks would have
been ineligible for involuntary civil commitment because only
one of the necessary elements was present.66 At the time the
State detained him under the Act, Hendricks had completed
nearly all of his sentence for committing indecent liberties with
two children ten years earlier.6 7 Using a traditional approach, he
62. See id. at 23-24.
63. Although the Court did not discuss the elimination of this distinction in
Hendricks, the Court consciously knew that validating the Kansas statute would cre-
ate a new category of incarceration. During oral argument, the Court characterized
the Act as "a hybrid between a criminal statute and a civil statute." See Transcript,
supra note 36, at *7. The Attorney General for the State of Kansas concurred with
the description, stating, "It's a hybrid between criminal sentencing and treatment in
lieu of punishment," although she insisted that the "hybrid" resulted in a civil com-
mitment. Id.
64. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136 (Kan. 1996), rev'd, 521 U.S. 346
(1997). Psychiatrists and psychologists differ in their opinions of whether pedophilia
is a treatable disease. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 365-67 (1997).
Hendricks himself appeared to believe that pedophilia is not a treatable illness. At
the jury trial held to determine whether he should be deemed a "sexually violent
predator," it was revealed that Hendricks had expressed to the state's physician his
opinion that "treatment is bull-." Id. at 355. The question of feasibility of treat-
ment, however, should be an objective evaluation and should not be left to the indi-
vidual respondent to determine. The State believed that treatment was possible. See
Transcript, supra note 36, at *12.
65. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 364.
66. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
67. See Brief for Leroy Hendricks Cross-Petitioner at *2, Hendricks (Nos. 95-1649,
95-9075), available in 1996 WL 450661 [hereinafter Brief for Cross-Petitioner]; see
also infra notes 72-91 and accompanying text (providing a more detailed depiction of
the facts in Hendricks).
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would have been ineligible for further criminal confinement be-
cause he would have had the protection of the Ex Post Facto
Clause," and/or the Double Jeopardy Clause.69 In short, under
the traditional guidelines for imposing involuntary incarceration,
whether civil or criminal, Hendricks would have been released.
What makes the Hendricks decision unique is that the Court
fashioned its decision in a way that deprived Hendricks of the
constitutional protections offered by either the civil or the crimi-
nal processes.7 0 Even more disturbing for future cases, the Court
did so without providing an express explanation for circumvent-
ing the safeguards intended to protect and promote individual
liberty.
71
KANsAS V. HENDRICKS: BACKGROUND
On November 26, 1984, the State of Kansas convicted fifty-
year-old Leroy Hendricks of taking "indecent liberties" 72 with
two thirteen-year-old boys.73 In compliance with the State's rec-
ommendation pursuant to a plea agreement, Hendricks was
sentenced to a five-to-twenty year prison term.4 After serving
nearly ten years of his sentence, Hendricks was scheduled for
release to a halfway house on September 11, 1994.75
On May 11, 1994, the Kansas legislature enacted the Sexually
Violent Predators Act,76 which provided:
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall ... pass any ... ex post facto
Law ....").
69. Id. amend. V (providing, in pertinent part, "nor shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb").
70. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357, 363.
71. See infra notes 115-18 and accompanying text (discussing possible reasons for
the Court's willingness to write its opinion in vague terms).
72. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3503 (1994) (defining "indecent liberties with a
child").
73. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 130 (Kan. 1996), rev'd, 521 U.S. 346
(1997).
74. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 353-54.
75. See id.
76. The Act was prompted by the rape, sodomization, and strangulation of 19-
year-old Stephanie Schmidt by her coworker, a convicted rapist who had been re-
leased after serving a 10-year prison term. See Stovall, supra note 16, at 1.
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A small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent
predators exist who do not have a mental disease or defect
that renders them appropriate for involuntary treatment piir-
suant to the treatment act for mentally ill persons ... which
is intended to provide short-term treatment to individuals
with serious mental disorders and then return them to the
community.... [S]exually violent predators' likelihood of en-
gaging in repeat acts of predatory sexual violence is high.
The existing involuntary commitment procedure... is inade-
quate to address the risk these sexually violent predators
pose to society .... [T]herefore a civil commitment procedure
for the long-term care and treatment of the sexually violent
77predator is found to be necessary ....
The remainder of the Act sets forth a procedure for the involun-
tary commitment of individuals who had been convicted and in-
carcerated for a sexually violent offense.78
The Act permitted the State to file a petition requesting that
the individual be classified as a "sexually violent predator,"
which would trigger a procedure resulting in his involuntary
incarceration.79 Hendricks was the first person to be evaluated
under the Act.8" The Act entitled an offender to a hearing to de-
termine whether he should be classified as a sexually violent
predator.81 At his hearing, Hendricks moved to dismiss the peti-
tion, arguing that the Act was unconstitutional.82
The lower court reserved its ruling on the constitutionality of
the statute, but held that the Act provided for "civil rather than
criminal or quasi-criminal" incarceration.83 For that reason, the
77. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
78. See id. § 59-29a03(a)(1)-(4) (Supp. 1997). The statute also applied to individu-
als who were charged with an offense of sexual violence but who had been deemed
incompetent to stand trial, tried for a sexually violent offense but had been found
not guilty by reason of insanity, or tried and found not guilty of an offense of sexu-
al violence when the jury answered affirmatively to special questions posed. See id.
79. See id. §§ 59-29a04 to 59-29a05 (Supp. 1997).
80. See Brief for Cross-Petitioner, supra note 67, at *1.
81. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07 (Supp. 1997).
82. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 130 (Kan. 1996), rev'd, 521 U.S. 346
(1997). Hendricks's motion also claimed that the State had breached the plea agree-
ment. The district court dismissed the allegations of breach and Hendricks did not
appeal. See id.
83. Id.
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lower court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination did not apply, and ordered Hendricks to testi-
fy and to comply with a psychological evaluation to assist the
jury in its determination of whether he should be classified as a
"sexually violent predator.""M
Denied the privilege against self-incrimination at his trial,
Hendricks admitted to being a pedophile and testified that his
history of sexual involvement with children began in 1955.85 The
State called a series of witnesses, including a psychologist who
testified that Hendricks suffered from pedophilia (a condition
that could be considered a mental abnormality), a girl to whom
Hendricks had exposed himself to in 1955, and Hendricks's
stepdaughter and stepson who testified that he had violated
them repeatedly when they were children.86 The jury ruled that
Hendricks was "a sexually violent predator," and committed
him.87
Hendricks appealed his constitutional claims. The Kansas Su-
preme Court declared the Act unconstitutional because it violat-
ed Hendricks's right to substantive due process.88 The State of
Kansas then appealed and Hendricks cross-petitioned for certio-
rari on his Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto claims.8 9 The Su-
preme Court granted both petitions and reversed the Kansas Su-
preme Court, holding that the Act's definition of "mental abnor-
mality" was sufficient to satisfy due process.90 The Court de-
ferred to the legislature's stated intent to create a "civil" statute
and held that because the Act was not penal in nature,
Hendricks was not entitled to relief through either the Double
Jeopardy or Ex Post Facto clauses. 91
84. See id.
85. See id. at 131.
86. See id. at 143.
87. See id. at 131.
88. See id. at 138. Kansas's highest court did not address Hendricks's other claims
after finding that the Act violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
89. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997).
90. See id. at 356. "Mental abnormality' means a congenital or acquired condition
affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit
sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health
and safety of others." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (Supp. 1997).
91. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369.
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KANSAS V. HENDRICKS: ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION
In Hendricks, Justice Thomas wrote for a five member majori-
ty, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Scalia. During oral argument, Justice Scalia dem-
onstrated an apparent lack of support for the Act,92 yet did not
write separately to articulate his views on the subject. Justice
Breyer wrote the dissenting opinion, joined in its entirety by
Justices Stevens and Souter and by Justice Ginsberg as to Parts
II and III." The method of analysis and the language used in
the majority opinion, more than the actual holding of the case,
carry the most significant ramifications.
Setting the Stage: The Introductory Language of the Opinion
Justice Thomas crafted the initial language of the majority
opinion to gain widespread support for the Court's ruling.94 It
began by stating that Hendricks had a "long history of sexually
molesting children,"95 and subsequently quoted a large section of
the Act, which stated in part that "[a] small but extremely dan-
gerous group of sexually violent predators exist."96 Nothing in
the statute suggested that this statement was a fact supported
by research and scientific study. Rather, it was an opinion ex-
pressed by the Kansas legislature that the Court later accepted
at face value.97 Although the legislature was not necessarily in
92. For example, in objecting to Justice Kennedy's questioning, Justice Scalia face-
tiously suggested, "maybe we could preventatively detain everybody that's released
because he's committed one crime and is likely to commit another one." Transcript,
supra note 36, at *46. The author was present at the oral argument before the Su-
preme Court and witnessed this exchange.
93. Part I of the dissent agreed with the majority that the Act satisfied the re-
quirements of due process. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373-74 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Ginsberg's failure to join that portion of the opinion suggests that she would find
the Act unconstitutional on due process grounds as well. See id. at 373 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
94. Hendricks received a significant amount of media coverage. See, e.g., Jerry
Adler & Peter Annin, Too Dangerous to Set Free?, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 9, 1996, at-38;
Joan Biskupic, High Court Will Review State Sex Predator Laws: Extra Confinement
Post Sentence at Issue, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 1996, at A15.
95. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 351.
96. Id. at 351 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994)).
97. See id. at 350-51.
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error, it is disturbing that the Court found it unnecessary to test
and evaluate the basic premise upon which the statute rested.
98
The Court also accepted the Kansas legislature's statutory
acknowledgment that sexually violent predators did not have a
mental disease or defect such that they qualified for involuntary
civil commitment under the Act, and that the possibility of re-
forming sexually violent predators in a prison setting was poor.99
The Court performed no independent analysis of the possibility
of reforming sexually violent predators, nor did it even object to
the classification of a group of individuals in one vilified group.
Implicitly, the Court accepted, without analysis, the legitimacy
of a legislature lumping together individuals with certain char-
acter traits under a single, stigmatic label.0 0
Spinning the Facts
The Court's depiction of the facts not only helped engender
support for the ultimate decision, but also created such a loath-
ing for Hendricks as to dispel any sympathy the public might
have for an individual who remained involuntarily confined even
after he had served his debt to society. For example, the Court
noted that "Hendricks' own testimony revealed a chilling history
of repeated child sexual molestation and abuse," and quoted his
statement that "the only sure way he could keep from sexually
abusing children in the future was 'to die.'"'0 ' The Court empha-
sized that other members of society had viewed Hendricks as an
extremely dangerous individual: "The jury unanimously found
beyond a reasonable doubt that Hendricks was a sexually vio-
lent predator."' 2 The Court's deliberate stress upon the consensus
98. This is consistent with the Court's extreme deference to the Kansas
legislature's intent in promulgating the Act. See id. at 359-60; see also infra notes
148-50, 153-55 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's deferential treatment
of the legislature).
99. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 351 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-26a01 (1994 &
Supp. 1997)).
100. The Court may have been taking its cue from state legislatures that draft in-
voluntary civil commitment statutes to be predicated upon an individual's status. See
Eric S. Janus, Sex Offender Commitments: Debunking the Official Narrative and
Revealing the Rules-in-Use, STAN. L. & POLY REV., Summer 1997, at 71, 71.
101. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 354.
102. Id. at 355. Although the legislature had declared the Act to be a "civil" statute,
1999] 1441
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1427
of others regarding Hendricks's dangerousness was another
attempt to garner public support against Hendricks and others
similarly situated.
Rejection of the Concept of Absolute Individual Liberty
After setting the stage such that Hendricks would be viewed
in the worst possible light, the Court then turned to the more
theoretical concept of individual liberty. The Court began this
portion of its argument by reiterating that citizens have no ab-
solute right to liberty in all cases at all times.' °3 It cited prece-
dent to support the proposition that concern for "the common
good" may take precedence over an individual's liberty.'' The
Court recognized an individual's right to be free from physical
restraint, but then provided a lengthy discussion of the commu-
nity's right to withhold that liberty."5 The Court concluded: "It
thus cannot be said that the involuntary civil confinement of a
limited subclass of dangerous persons is contrary to our under-
standing of ordered liberty."" 6
Protect Society, Confine the Dangerous: The Heart of the Court's
Argument
Dangerousness as the Key to Involuntary Civil Commitment
Having framed the factual history of the case, the Court pro-
ceeded to examine the Act. 0 7 It noted with approval that the
see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-26a01, the Kansas Supreme Court advised that the trial
court should employ the "reasonable doubt" standard to determine whether
Hendricks was a sexually violent predator. This standard typically is reserved for
criminal proceedings. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 132 (1996), rev'd, 521 U.S.
346 (1997); see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979) (stating that the
reasonable doubt standard is used in criminal trials). The Hendricks Court dismissed
Hendricks's argument that the use of a reasonable doubt standard made the commit-
ment hearings criminal in nature. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 364. The Court stated
that providing additional safeguards to the individual failed to "transform a civil
commitment proceeding into a criminal prosecution." See id. at 364-65.
103. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356-57.
104. See id. (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)).
105. See id. at 357.
106. Id. at 358.
107. See id. at 350.
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"Act unambiguously require[d] a finding of dangerousness [to
the individual or to the community] as a prerequisite to involun-
tary confinement." °8 Significantly, the Court chose to begin its
examination of the Act with the dangerousness determination.
In previous cases, the threshold question had not been the
threat the individual posed to society, but rather the state of his
mental health."9 In Hendricks, the Court bypassed the mental
illness question and focused immediately on the "dangerousness"
of the threat that Hendricks posed to society at large." This
change in approach has severe implications, particularly when
coupled with the Court's analytical manipulations that permit-
ted it to find that Hendricks was sufficiently "mentally ill" to
qualify for involuntary civil commitment.
Despite its ultimate classification of the Act as "civil," the
Court was willing to look to elements of criminal behavior and
procedure to support the Act's constitutionality. For example,
the Court cited the permissibility of using past behavior to pre-
dict "future criminal conduct.""" In this way, the Court accept-
ed that civil detainment authorized by a civil statute was used
permissibly to prevent criminal behavior. The Court did not ad-
dress this inconsistency, seemingly relying on the apparent dan-
gerousness of the individual as sufficient justification.
Sexual Predators are Mentally "Abnormal" and Qualify for
Involuntary Civil Commitment
After establishing that dangerousness was an important, and
possibly the central issue with respect to involuntary civil com-
mitment, the Court stated that dangerousness was an acceptable
basis for detainment only when "some additional factor" was
present as well." The Court found that a "mental abnormality"
satisfied this "additional factor" test."' These conclusions have
108. Id. at 357.
109. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
110. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357-59.
111. Id. at 357 (emphasis added) (quoting Schail v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278
(1984)).
112. Id. at 358.
113. See id. at 358-60.
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two primary implications: first, that a "mental abnormality"-as
opposed to a "mental illness"--is sufficient to warrant the civil
confinement of a dangerous individual; and second, that the
"additional factor" need not necessarily involve a consideration
of the individual's mental health, although that consideration
was the key to traditional involuntary civil commitment."
The great uncertainty that surrounds the psychiatric commu-
nity's articulation of "mental illness" and the questionable effec-
tiveness of providing treatment for pedophiles are possible ex-
planations for the Court's declination to restrict the requisite
"additional factor" to a consideration of the individual's mental
health. 5 The Court discussed possible distinctions between a
"mental abnormality" and "mental illness," and noted that ex-
perts disagree on whether pedophilia qualifies as a "mental ill-
ness." 6 Apparently unwilling to join either side of the debate,
the Court reasoned that the use of the phrase "mental abnor-
mality" was the legislature's attempt to reconcile the uncertain-
ty. 7 The Court declared that it had never required legislatures
to use any particular terminology and rejected Hendricks's argu-
ment that the Act was unconstitutional because it failed to re-
quire a finding of "mental illness." 8
The Court neglected to explore at least two implications of its
acceptance of the Kansas legislature's term "mental abnormali-
ty." First, in relegating the discussion to a semantic level, it ig-
nored the fact that the term "mental abnormality" was a legisla-
tive construction that lacked any basis in the psychiatric com-
munity."9 Although psychiatrists and psychologists debate what
114. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
115. Justice O'Connor appeared to be especially concerned about the lack of certain-
ty surrounding whether a pedophile could be deemed to be "mentally ill," and
whether being a pedophile is a curable condition. See Transcript, supra note 36, at
*44-46.
116. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359.
117. See id.
118. Id. at 359-60 (emphasis added); supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
119. The Court noted and dismissed this concern, stating that traditionally legisla-
tures have had
the task of defining terms of a medical nature that have legal signifi-
cance.... Often, those definitions do not fit precisely with the defini-
tions employed by the medical community ... Legal definitions, however,
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specific elements characterize a "mental illness," that term signi-
fies a degree of physiological disturbance supported by scientific
studies and literature."n The term "mental abnormality," howev-
er, is a purely legislative attempt to incorporate into the Act in-
dividuals who might not fall within the technical definition of
"mental illness." 21 The term "mental abnormality" is a tool for
consensus-building, not a signal bearing any academic or scien-
tific support.
The Court also failed to recognize that because the phrase
"mental abnormality" lacks a recognized definition, the term is
much broader than "mental illness." The Act does not provide
guidelines stipulating the elements of a "mental abnormality,"
nor identify entities with the power to determine what qualifies
as an "abnormality."22 As written in the Act, it is the trier of
fact who determines whether the individual exhibits "abnormal"
tendencies.' Involuntary incarceration therefore becomes fo-
cused not on the individual, as in traditional involuntary civil
commitment analysis," but on the community's view of "nor-
malcy."
Without more stringent guidelines, reliance upon societal de-
termination is amorphous at best. Social concerns fluctuate with
changing times, and what is deemed abnormal at one point in
which must "take into account such issues as individual responsibility ...
and competency," need not mirror those advanced by the medical pro-
fession.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359 (quoting AMERICAN PSYcHIATRIc ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, at xxii, xxvii (4th ed. 1994)).
120. See ARTHUR ET AL., supra note 23, at 11.
121. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359.
122. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (Supp. 1997).
123. See id. § 59-29a06 (Supp. 1997). Hendricks demanded a jury trial for the de-
termination of his status as a sexually violent predator. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at
354. The statute does not require one, however, and thus the definition of "mental
abnormality" conceivably could rest within the hands of a single judge. The Court
determined that the Act was a "civil" statute and therefore that the "criminal"
protections of the Fifth Amendment did not apply, thus, presumably the Sixth
Amendment right to an attorney would be unavailable as well. See id. at 367-70.
The implication of Hendricks, therefore, is that an unrepresented individual who is
deemed "dangerous" could be incarcerated if a trial judge decided that his behavior
preceding his criminal sentence was "abnormal."
124. For a discussion of the traditional approach to involuntary civil commitment,
see supra notes 28-40 and accompanying text.
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history is acceptable in another. The deprivation of individual
liberty thus becomes inextricably intertwined not with law and
its precedent, or science and its objective studies, but with social
mores that are subjective in nature and change quickly. The def-
inition of "mental abnormality" is an uncertain foundation on
which to support such an integral societal concept as "[tihe right
of the people to be secure in their persons."125 Although the "ad-
ditional factor" test apparently is supposed to prevent legislators
from confining people merely because they are deemed "danger-
ous," it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which the state could
prove "dangerousness" without also being able to prove a claim
of "mental abnormality." It seems that a mere finding of danger-
ousness could be sufficient to deprive an individual of his liberty,
notwithstanding the language to the contrary in Hendricks.1
26
By holding that the combination of dangerousness and an un-
identified "additional factor" was enough to compel commitment,
the Court stepped far wide of the traditional standard for invol-
untary civil commitment that demanded that the individual be
diagnosed with a mental impairment. 2 The Court cited exam-
ples of acceptable "additional factors," 2 but failed to define the
term. The State of Kansas favored the phrase "mental abnormal-
ity," a term that described conditions that the Supreme Court
characterized as "medically recognized."'29 The Supreme Court,
however, articulated no such preference for a pseudo-medical
term. Essentially, the Court stated that because the dominant
group viewed pedophiles as "abnormal," legislators legitimately
could deprive them of their liberty without any recognized medi-
cal or psychological justification.3 0
125. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
126. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358 ("A finding of dangerousness, standing alone,
is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to justify indefinite involuntary
commitment.").
127. See supra text accompanying note 47.
128. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358. The Court looked to earlier cases in which it had
upheld civil commitment statutes that employed mental health terminology. See id.
(citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 314-15 (1993) ("mental retardation")); Allen v.
Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 366 (1986) ("mental illness"); Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Pro-
bate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 271-72 (1940) ("psychotic personality").
129. See Transcript, supra note 36, at *23-24.
130. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359-60.
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Although it is difficult to argue that a pedophile does not suf-
fer from some sort of mental illness, this holding opens the door
for future legislators to commit others who have a much more
distant connection to any type of mental illness, simply because
the legislature deems them to be too "dangerous" to roam freely
about the community.13 1 The Court thus provided an opportunity
for a future expansion of the factors used to consider whether an
individual has a "mental abnormality" that might not have any
bearing upon the individual's mental health. After Hendricks,
then, the central question in an involuntary civil commitment
hearing is not the mental health of the individual, but rather
whether that individual poses a danger to society, and whether
he exhibits any character traits that are sufficiently compelling
to serve as the necessary "additional factor" to warrant seques-
tering him from the community.'32
Evidence of Mental Abnormality: Reliance on Self-Incrimination
The Court determined that Hendricks's "lack of volitional con-
trol" evidenced his affliction with a mental abnormality." In
finding that Hendricks was incapable of exerting self-control, the
Court relied heavily upon his own statements. The opinion twice
quoted Hendricks's testimony that, "when he 'get[s] stressed
out,' he 'can't control the urge' to molest children."'4 The Court
concluded that Hendricks's diagnosis as a pedophile, combined
with his own admissions that validated the diagnosis, and the
"prediction of future dangerousness" were sufficient to sustain
an imposition of involuntary civil commitment.3 5 In essence, the
Court found that pedophilia was a "mental illness" for the pur-
pose of determining whether an individual suffering from that
condition is subject to involuntary civil commitment. 36 The
131. During oral argument, the Court raised various hypothetical scenarios address-
ing this point. See Transcript, supra note 36, at *20-21, *31, *49 (discussing poten-
tial statutes aimed at arsonists, armed robbers, and murderers).
132. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358.
133. Id. at 360.
134. Id. at 355, 360 (quoting In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 144 (1996), rev'd, 521
U.S. 346 (1997)).
135. Id. at 360.
136. See id.
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Court's conclusion is not unreasonable, given the state of uncer-
tainty in the psychiatric community17 and the dire threat that
pedophiles pose to children. By using Hendricks's self-incrimi-
nating statements as an analytical shortcut around a ruling that
pedophilia did in fact constitute a "mental illness," however, the
Court left several tacit questions unanswered.
The Court used Hendricks's admission that he could not pre-
vent himself from desiring to molest children when he became
"stressed out" against him, assuming that Hendricks, who may
be mentally ill, was sufficiently capable of asserting a judgment
about his own condition. 8' This framework brings to mind two
questions: If an individual is mentally abnormal, should judicial
judgment rest upon the direct testimony of that individual? If
that individual is mentally abnormal, how is the testimony at all
reliable?
Conversely, even if the individual is "normal," judicial reliance
upon the individual's testimony creates an enormous incentive to
lie. Hendricks was honest when he conceded, in graphic terms,
that he was unable to testify with any certainty that he would
be able to refrain from his pedophilia at all times in the fu-
ture.139 The Court used his admission and his past behavior to
find him eligible for involuntary commitment.' Would the evi-
dence of past behavior alone have been sufficient to commit
him? The Court suggested that it might not, and that such an
individual might require criminal commitment proceedings and
the constitutional protections such criminalization would en-
tail.' It seems, therefore, that the Court will permit the state to
deprive an honest offender of his constitutional rights by deem-
ing the proceeding to be "civil," while rewarding a dishonest
offender who claimed that he had completely "recovered" with
the constitutional protections granted to criminal defendants.
137. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
138. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 355, 360.
139. See supra text accompanying note 101.
140. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360.
141. See id. ("This admitted lack of volitional control, coupled with a prediction of
future dangerousness, adequately distinguishes Hendricks from other dangerous per-
sons who are perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceed-
ings." (emphasis added)).
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Deference to the Legislature: The Act is a Civil Statute
Hendricks argued that, despite the language used in the stat-
ute, the Act established criminal proceedings.14 2 The Court stat-
ed that Hendricks had three claims to support his contention
that the Act was a criminal statute.14 First, the "confinement's
potentially indefinite duration [was] evidence of the State's puni-
tive intent."' Second, the State's use of safeguards typically re-
served for criminal hearings indicated the criminal nature of the
proceedings." Third, the State's failure to provide treatment
revealed the legislature's intent to create a criminal statute.'
Hendricks argued that because the proceedings were criminal,
the resulting incarceration was criminal as well.'47 The Court
disagreed. It held that "[tihe categorization of a particular pro-
ceeding as civil or criminal 'is first of all a question of statutory
construction.' "148
The majority did not address the Kansas Supreme Court's
finding that treatment was an inseparable element of civil com-
mitments, and summarily dismissed the Kansas court's asser-
tion that "[i]t is clear that the primary objective of the Act is to
continue incarceration and not to provide treatment."49 The
Kansas court had ample reason to believe that the legislative
intent was, in fact, punitive: 'The record reflects that treatment
for sexually violent predators is all but nonexistent. The legisla-
ture concedes that sexually violent predators are not amenable
142. See id. at 361,
143. See id. at 362-65.
144. Id. at 363.
145. See id. at 364.
146. See id. at 365; see also infra note 228 (noting the lack of treatment available
to Hendricks when he was committed under the Act).
147. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361.
148. Id. (quoting Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368 (1986)).
149. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136 (1996), rev'd, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). The
Supreme Court stated:
Even if we accept this determination that the provision of treatment was
not the Kansas Legislature's 'overriding' or 'primary' purpose in passing
the Act, this does not rule out the possibility that an ancillary purpose of
the Act was to provide treatment, and it does not require us to conclude
that the Act is punitive.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 367.
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to treatment under [the Act] .... In that light, the provisions of
the Act for treatment appear somewhat disingenuous."' 50
At the time the Kansas legislature passed the Act, "[tihe testi-
mony before the Kansas Senate Judiciary Committee left little
doubt about the actual intent and purpose of the Kansas legisla-
tion."' 5' The Attorney General of Kansas argued to the Commit-
tee, "'[Ylou have an opportunity to pass what might be the most
significant preventive criminal justice legislation to be presented
in this ... session.... [The Act] will act prospectively and be
preventative of criminal conduct and not just punitive.""' It is
evident that the Kansas Attorney General intended to use the
statute as a criminal justice mechanism.
Although the dissent placed considerable emphasis on the
findings of the Kansas Supreme Court with respect to state leg-
islative intent,153 the Hendricks majority ignored both the lower
court and the Act's legislative history by restricting its analysis
to the four corners of the document. The Court stated that it
would give effect to the facial intent of the legislature unless "a
party challenging the statute provides 'the clearest proof that
the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect
150. Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 136; see also Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 365-67 (discussing
possible interpretations of the Kansas Supreme Court's opinion regarding treatment
of offenders). The Kansas court's reading of the statute was indeed echoed by state-
ments made by legislators at the time the Kansas legislature passed the Act. For
example, one member of the Task Force that proposed the legislation said, '"Because
there is no effective treatment for sex offenders, this Bill may mean a life sentence
for a felon that is considered a risk to women and children. SO BE IT!" Id. at 385
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting statement of Jim Blaufuss).
151. Thomas J. Weilert, Thoughts on the Cost of Freedom, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 17,
20 (1997).
152. Id. (quoting Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act: Hearing on SB525 Before
the Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 75th Legis. (Kan. 1994) (testimony of Robert T. Ste-
phen, Attorney General)).
153. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 382-84 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("We have generally
given considerable weight to the findings of state and lower federal courts regarding
the intent or purpose underlying state officials' actions . . . ."). Justice Breyer quoted
a recent opinion that held that "ordinarily '[w]e must ...accept the State Court's
view of the purpose of its own law.'" Id. at 383 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thorton, 514 U.S. 779, 830 (1995)). The dissent also cited pre-
cedent that "in close cases the label [attached to the statute by the legislature] is
'not of paramount importance.'" Id. at 380 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Depart-
ment of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 777 (1994)).
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as to negate [the state's] intention 'to deem it civil.'"' The Court
stated that only in those "limited circumstances" will a court
reclassify an allegedly civil statute as criminal.'55
Such extreme deference to the legislature prohibits any judi-
cial scrutiny of legislative purpose. The Court imposed the bur-
den of proof on Hendricks, and ultimately held that he failed to
meet what it acknowledged to be a "heavy burden."5 ' Hendricks
had to rebut the presumption that the legislature was acting
with pure intent, although the Court refused to consider the leg-
islative history that demonstrated otherwise. Similarly, the ma-
jority apparently was not persuaded that imposition of physical
restraints upon Hendricks's liberty was a punitive effect of the
purportedly civil scheme.157 To the contrary, the Court failed to
address the proposition that the commitment represented a
threat to individual liberty, despite precedent that "recognized
that civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant
deprivation of liberty."5 s Implicit in the Court's holding, then, is
that the state's initial showing of dangerousness alone is suffi-
cient, by itself, to create an allegedly rebuttable presumption
that the state should revoke the individual's freedom.
A METHOD TO ITS MADNESS? POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR
THE COURT'S APPARENT WILLINGNESS TO CIRCUMVENT
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS
As seen in Hendricks, characterizing a statute as nonpunitive
prevents an individual from invoking the constitutional
protections provided by the self-incrimination, Double Jeopardy
and Ex Post Facto clauses.'59 This in itself presents a paradox.
Only individuals who have committed crimes against society are
154. Id. at 361 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)).
155. Id. The Court did not suggest what evidence it would have considered suffi-
cient to negate the stated legislative intent.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 361-62.
158. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979); see also Humphrey v. Cady, 405
U.S. 504, 509 (1972) (noting that involuntary commitment results in a "massive
curtailment of liberty"); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1967) (stating that a depri-
vation of liberty occurs whenever a person is "held against his will").
159. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369-70; supra text accompanying note 91.
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awarded considerable protections. The founders provided extra
protections to criminal defendants because criminal proceedings
potentially led to the deprivation of individual liberty. 6 ' They
likely assumed that the consequences of civil proceedings would
not put the respondent "in jeopardy of life or limb."'6' When a
civil proceeding has the same results as a criminal trial, howev-
er, there seems to be little justification for denying constitution-
al protections to the individual. Although the Court did conform
to precedent by refusing to apply criminal protections in civil
cases, 6 2 that conformity stemmed from the civil label it placed
on the Hendricks case, and not from the rationale underlying
the protections. Perhaps the most critical question is why the
Court chose not to grant these protections to certain individuals.
The most basic explanation appears to be the Court's concern
for public safety. Contrary to traditional rationales justifying
involuntary civil commitment with concern for the individual,
the Court approved the Act despite the fact that its "chief pur-
pose... [was] to afford protection for society, not to ensure
treatment for the patient."6 ' Throughout the opinion, the Court
repeated the need to protect society.' The underlying assump-
tion was that Hendricks, and others similarly situated, are in-
herently dangerous, and that the need to protect the public from
the threat they pose so outweighs their individual rights that it
is permissible to circumvent those rights to keep the dangerous
isolated from the rest of the community.'65 This assumption led
to the implicit understanding that an initial showing of danger-
ousness is sufficient to presume the validity of involuntary com-
mitment.
66
160. See Leonard W. Levy, The Bill of Rights, in THE AMERICAN FOUNDING: ESSAYS
ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 295, 298-301, 309-10 (J. Jackson Barlow
et al. eds., 1988).
161. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
162. See, e.g., Addington, 441 U.S. at 418 (rejecting the application of the "beyond
a reasonable doubt" standard to a civil proceeding, because that strict standard is
reserved for criminal defendants).
163. Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures, 79 HARV.
L. REv. 1288, 1291 (1966).
164. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 351, 356-57, 363-64, 371.
165. See id. at 356-60.
166. See id. at 363. The Court expressly stated that dangerousness alone would not
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Other reasons might explain why the Court did not enforce
the constitutional protections of those committed under the Act.
The Court truly may have been concerned about individuals, like
pedophiles, who are deemed to be "mentally ill" by a significant
portion, but not the majority, of the psychiatric community. Giv-
en the limitations on current medical knowledge, it is likely that
the Court was willing to expand the concept of "mental illness"
to provide for uncertainties that exist within the realm of knowl-
edge.16 By failing to restrict the holding to sexual offenders, the
Court might have recognized, albeit implicitly, that there are
other habitual offenders, like serial killers, who are similarly
situated, and that society might benefit from their confinement.
This reasoning is flawed, however, because it fails to address
the sexual offender's culpability. At the time of Hendricks's con-
viction, the State could have imposed a significantly higher
criminal penalty.168 If the correlation between culpability and
be enough to warrant involuntary civil confinement. See id. at 358. For an explana-
tion of the argument that the opposite is actually true, see supra text accompanying
note 126.
167. It is clear that at least some of the Justices were concerned about the uncer-
tain state of medical knowledge regarding mental illness in general and pedophilia
in particular, especially with respect to the likelihood of recidivism. See, e.g., Tran-
script, supra note 36, at *45 (recording Chief Justice Rehnquist's question in re-
sponse to counsel's argument that it is impermissible to commit an individual based
on a mere possibility that he might repeat the crime, "So what's the State supposed
to do, just wait till he goes out and does it again?"); see also Foucha v. Louisiana,
504 U.S. 71, 109-10 (1992) (demonstrating Justice Thomas's hesitancy to rely on a
"mental illness" label in the absence of a consensus by the psychiatric community);
supra note 115 (describing Justice O'Connor's concern regarding the potential of cur-
ing pedophilia).
168. In some cases, it is unnecessary to increase criminal sentences. Prosecutors
need only seek the most severe penalties available. Indeed, as Hendricks argued in
his brief to the U.S. Supreme Court:
In 1984 . .. Hendricks was charged with three counts of taking indecent
liberties with a child .... Each charge carried a maximum penalty of 5
to 20 years imprisonment. The court was authorized to impose consecu-
tive sentences for each count and could have tripled each sentence under
the habitual criminal act because of [his] prior convictions. The maximum
allowable sentence for the offenses charged was therefore a total of 45 to
180 years. Had he received the maximum sentence, [he] would have first
been eligible for parole in 2007, at age 73 ....
Brief for Cross-Petitioner, supra note 67, at *3 (citations omitted). The State plea-
bargained with Hendricks, and ultimately, the trial court sentenced him to 5 to 20
years in prison. See id. If the State had sought the maximum sentence, Hendricks
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1427
penance is to have any meaning, the legislature cannot be per-
mitted to overturn a criminal sentence through legislative ac-
tion, particularly when that action is taken after the criminal
sentence has been fulfilled.'69 The Court's approach is unlikely
to apply to the most heinous of criminals, because criminal sen-
tences in those cases are such that this process would never
arise. This Note in no way attempts to mitigate the seriousness
of child sexual abuse. It simply suggests that the proper way to
deal with such offenders is to impose the maximum criminal
sentence, and not to create a linguistic quagmire that justifies
the deprivation of an individual's constitutional rights.
The Court might have ruled as it did in response to public
opinion and media pressure. Offenses against children, particu-
larly sexual offenses, recently have received increased media
attention and community interest.'10 The desire to shield chil-
dren from sexual abuse has led to a variety of legislative actions
on state and federal levels.' 7 ' The Court may have picked up on
these recent trends and feared that promoting the rights of an
individual pedophile over that of a legislature purportedly pro-
tecting its children would lead to public outrage, and might dis-
courage the promulgation of other legislation designed to pre-
vent child sexual abuse.
Finally, the Court may have considered Kansas's interest in
attempting to lower its crime rate. Sexual offenses are insidious
and difficult to prosecute because they are conducted in private
and may leave no tell-tale signs of abuse.'72 Some legal rules
would have been isolated from the community's children for at least 23 years in a
constitutionally permissible manner. Nonetheless, many embrace civil commitment as
a "humane" alternative to criminal punishment. See Melissa R. Saad, Note, Civil
Commitment and the Sexually Violent Predator: Stability Without Tyranny and Lib-
erty Without Anarchy, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 595, 625 (1998).
169. The question of whether a legislature should be able to "correct" the sentence
of an individual by taking action that applies to an offender currently serving a sen-
tence is beyond the scope of this Note.
170. See Roger J.R. Levesque, Prosecuting Sex Crimes Against Children: Time for
"Outrageous" Proposals?, 19 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 59, 59-60 (1995).
171. See generally Carol L. Kunz, Comment, Toward Dispassionate, Effective Control
of Sexual Offenders, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 453 (1997) (discussing the history and cur-
rent status of sexual offender registration and notification laws in the United
States).
172. See Levesque, supra note 170, at 65.
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already reflect the need to treat sexual offenses differently be-
cause of their unique nature.'73 The Court simply may have con-
sidered the Act a natural extension of the need to treat sexual
offenders differently. If this was the Court's rationale, however,
it could have narrowed its holding by articulating its concerns
regarding the prosecution of sexual offenses. The Court's failure
to do so effectively extended an invitation to legislatures to in-
carcerate other "undesirables" through a "civil" procedure.
THE BIG PICTURE: THE EFFECT OF HENDRICKS ON
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
The Hendricks decision and the Kansas Sexual Violent Preda-
tor Act resulted from efforts by the courts and the legislature to
protect the nation's children from the horrors of sexual abuse.174
Given that sexually violent predator laws fail to address the
heart of the problem, 75 however, there is little reason to believe
that such attempts will be an effective resolution.
The "Silent Epidemic"
Child sexual abuse is an enormous problem in the United
States, yet it is a reality that a majority of Americans find al-
most impossible to face. "For most people ... fathoming statis-
tics like the familiar 'one in five children risk sexual abuse be-
fore they reach eighteen years of age,' is difficult." 76 We as a
society are loathe to believe that adults brutalize children at
such a catastrophic rate. 7 Denial is a classic response to claims
173. For example, recent revisions to the Federal Rules of Evidence have rejected a
defendant's right to attack the character of the victim in a rape case, and have
created new provisions that broaden the admissibility of evidence against sexual
offenders. See FED. R. EVID. 412-15.
174. See Transcript, supra note 36, at *3-4.
175. This criticism also applies to community notification laws, commonly known as
"Megan's laws." Both target strangers who prey upon unsuspecting children. The
frightening reality, however, is that children are much more likely to be assaulted
by relatives or family friends than by unknown third parties. See infra note 205 and
accompanying text.
176. Freeman-Longo, supra note 17, at 308; see also PATRICK A. LANGAN &
CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CHILD RAPE VICTIMS 2 (1992) (de-
lineating percentages of rape victims in certain age groups).
177. In part because of tremendous underreporting, it is impossible to generate
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of child sexual abuse, 7 ' and it is only very recently that our so-
ciety has begun to "'confront[] a monster that's been hiding in
the closet.'' 79 Sexual abuse frequently is unreported,' 80 is com-
mitted in the absence of witnesses, and commonly leaves no out-
ward signs of maltreatment,'' and therefore has been character-
ized as a "silent epidemic.
" 182
One significant reason that child sexual abuse has remained
hidden so successfully for so long is that many incidents are not
reported until years after the occurrence, if at all.s Crimes of
sexual violence in general are less likely to be reported than oth-
er types of crime because of the shame, stigma, and variety of
social pressures placed on the victim."' Child victims particularly
accurate and reliable statistics regarding the current number of children who are
sexually abused each year. One study in the mid-1980s estimated that 210,000 new
cases of abuse occur annually. See David McCord, Expert Psychological Testimony
About Child Complainants in Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Foray into the Admissi-
bility of Novel Psychological Evidence, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 4 (1986).
Figures compiled by the U.S. Department of Justice in 1992 calculated 104,120 new
cases of juvenile rape in that year alone. See LANGAN & HARLOW, supra note 176.
In 1994, the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect approximated that 150,000
new cases of child sexual abuse are reported annually. See Levesque, supra note
170, at 65. Even these figures likely are lower than the actual incidence of abuse.
See id. at 64 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT
1992: REPORT FROM THE STATES TO THE NATIONAL CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT 9-10 (1984)). Figures chronicling the percentage of the adult population
that claims to have suffered sexual abuse during childhood also suggest that sexual
abuse is underreported, perhaps as much as 80%. See William Winslade et al., Cas-
trating Pedophiles Convicted of Sex Offenses Against Children: New Treatment or Old
Punishment?, 51 SMU L. REV. 349, 363 (1998).
178. For example, during the late nineteenth century, many women reported to
Sigmund Freud that they had been sexually molested as children. See McCord, su-
pra note 177, at 2. Freud refused to believe the apparent extreme prevalence of
child sexual abuse and he dismissed the claims as mere fantasies. See id.
179. JOHN HUBNER & JILL WOLFSON, SOMEBODY ELSE'S CHILDREN: THE COURTS,
THE KIDS, AND THE STRUGGLE TO SAvE AMERICA'S TROUBLED FAMEIEs 114 (1996)
(quoting Judge Leonard P. Edwards, Santa Clara County Juvenile Court).
180. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
181. See Karla-Dee Clark, Note, Innocent Victims and Blind Justice: Children's
Rights to be Free from Child Sexual Abuse, 7 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 214, 217
(1990); see also Levesque, supra note 170, at 65 (relating the statistic that more
than one-third of the victims of child sexual abuse exhibit no overt symptoms).
182. Freeman-Longo, supra note 17, at 303.
183. See supra note 177.
184. See Clark, supra note 181, at 225-26, 270-71.
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are unlikely to report or assist in the prosecution of sexual
offenses.18 5 Those who commit child sexual abuse typically en-
trap the child within a sphere of secrecy that impresses the need
for silence upon the child."8 6 Many individuals who violate chil-
dren, particularly the very young, are relatives or friends of the
child. 87 Children who are assaulted by people whom they trust
confront a severe loyalty conflict and tend not to reveal things
they have been asked to keep a secret.'88 Also, because the con-
viction or acquittal of an accused sexual offender turns in large
part upon the credibility of the victim, 189 many parents are re-
luctant to expose their child to the trauma of testifying in court,
especially if the accused is a close relative, 90 and therefore never
report the incident.
Other adults frequently provide vehement support for the al-
leged abuser;191 such support often exacerbates the victim's re-
luctance to report an incident. In cases in which the perpetrator
is the child's relative, "there is often long-standing active or pas-
sive family collusion" to prevent the incest from becoming public
knowledge.' 92 Many of the cases involve the spouse or boyfriend
185. See generally HUBNER & WOLFSON, supra note 179, at 114-16 (describing the
development of child abuse reporting laws and the problems presented by child wit-
nesses).
186. See Levesque, supra note 170, at 64-65.
187. See id. at 65 n.23; see also infra note 205 (providing statistics regarding the
relationships between child sexual abusers and their victims).
188. See Brian Harmon, Public Safety: Pedophiles Can Hide Under Many Guises:
'Predators' Come from All Backgrounds and Gain Trust of Victims, DET. NEwS, Nov.
18, 1997, at D1, available in 1997 WL 5604491.
189. See Kim L. Hooper, Child Molesting Case Goes to Jury: Defendant Faces Up to
50 Years in Prison If He Is Convicted of Assaulting 14-Year-Old Relative, INDIANAPO-
LIS STAR, Oct. 18, 1997, at W02, available in 1997 WL 2907913; see also Clark,
supra note 181, at 226 (stressing the importance of a child's testimony at trial due
to a general paucity of other evidence).
190. See HUBNER & WOLFSON, supra note 179, at 116.
191. Douglas Holt, Coach Has Support Despite Child-Sex Charges, CIII. TRIB., Dec.
19, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 16804370.
192. Andrew Cohen, Note, The Unreliability of Expert Testimony on the Typical
Characteristics of Sexual Abuse Victims, 74 GEO. L.J. 429, 430 n.4 (1985) (quoting C.
Henry Kempe, Sexual Abuse, Another Hidden Pediatric Problem: The 1977 C. Ander-
son Aldrich Lecture, in CHILD ABUSE: COMMISSION AND OMISSION 97, 99 (Joanne Val-
iant Cook & Roy Tyler Bowles eds., 1980).
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of the victim's mother, therefore, it is believed that many moth-
ers are "silent accomplices" to the abuse of their child." 3
'Despite the pressures placed on children to keep such inci-
dents secret, allegations of sexual abuse are relatively simple to
raise, 9 4 and can impart irrevocable harm to the accused, even if
the charges subsequently are recanted or dismissed. 9 ' Conse-
quently, concerns that a child might fabricate claims of sexual
abuse abound. 96 Those fears, combined with the devastating
impact false-charges may have upon the accused, and the broad
and ambiguous language of the child abuse laws 97 have generat-
ed complaints that the resulting "hysteria... has created the
modern equivalent of a witch-hunt."9 ' Judge Leonard P. Ed-
wards, a prominent juvenile court judge in Santa Clara, Califor-
nia, explained the problem by analogy:
"For the first time in history, our society has decided to take
the abuse of children seriously. ... That means looking into
every case, in much the same way that a mother listens to a
five-year-old's complaints about an aching stomach or a sore
throat. Usually, there is nothing wrong. But there is always
the chance that the five-year-old isn't just tired and whiny;
she is really sick."'99
Although sympathetic to the problem in theory, some parents
who have battled the system against false allegations complain
that it is too simple to activate an investigation that can quickly
193. See Levesque, supra note 170, at 65.
194. See Holt, supra note 191, at 1.
195. See, e.g., Henry Stern, Lincoln Park Teacher Arrested, PORTLAND OREGONIAN,
Jan. 29, 1998, at COI, available in 1998 WL 4177787 (relating a father's outrage
that charges of sexual abuse were levied against his son). The father stated: "[1If
[he] is innocent . . . all this publicity will destroy [him]. He's a teacher. You think
he's going to get a job somewhere else after this?" Id.
196. See, e.g., Caren Benjamin, Mother Ordered to Stand Trial, LAS VEGAS REV.-J.,
Mar. 11, 1998, at 1B, available in 1998 WL 7210625 (stating that two sisters' previ-
ous experiences with the department of social services "taught [them] that allega-
tions of sexual abuse could make people they wanted out of their lives disappear").
197. The imprecise language has led to a degree of overzealousness by teachers and
social workers in presenting and pursuing accusations against victim's fathers and
brothers. See HUBNER & WOLFSON, supra note 179, at 116-17.
198. Id. at 116.
199. Id. at 117 (quoting Judge Edwards).
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snowball into persecution. "[It doesn't take much to 'start the
nightmare. Someone-anyone!--can phone in an anonymous re-
port and the next thing you know there is a social worker at
your door, taking away your child.'"2" This criticism encourages
people to deny the existence and the magnitude of the child sex-
ual abuse problem.2° '
Sexual Offenders: Not Just (or Even Predominantly) Strangers
Sexual offenders often are stereotyped as "dirty old men in the
alley,"20 2 but most child sexual abuse occurs at the hands of
adults known to the victims.2"' Although statistics must be used
with caution, 2°' even conservative estimates demonstrate that
relatives, friends, and acquaintances pose a much higher degree
of risk than a stranger who seems to lurk in every shadow.20 5
Some psychologists blame the media for its fixation on sensa-
tional stories of child sexual abuse that give the public a distort-
ed perception of the true nature of the problem:
[Tihe sexual abuse cases that make national news and head-
lines do not represent the average sexual abuse cases in
America. The sexual abuse that happens each day in America
is not newsworthy. Therefore, the public's image of what sex-
ual abuse is and who is a sexual abuser is usually based only
200. Id. at 116 (quoting the spokesman of the Coalition of Concerned Parents, San-
ta Clara County).
201. See Levesque, supra note 170, at 80.
202. See Clark, supra note 181, at 216 n.3 (quoting Dwight M. Wells, Expert Testi-
mony: To Admit or Not to Admit, 57 FLA. B.J. 672, 672 (1983)).
203. See Levesque, supra note 170, at 65 n.23.
204. See supra note 177.
205. See Freeman-Longo, supra note 17, at 311 (stating that less than one percent
of incidents of sexual abuse are committed by individuals who fit the "dangerous
stranger" stereotype); see also HUBNER & WOLFSON, supra note 179, at 115 (describ-
ing the common misperception of the pervasive danger that unknown sexual offend-
ers pose to children throughout the nation). Statistics published by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice indicate that 15% of child rape victims between the ages of 12 and
17 are assaulted by strangers, while 20% are attacked by relatives, and 65% by
friends or acquaintances. See LANGAN & HARLOW, supra note 176, at 2. Only 4% of
the rapes against children under the age of 12 are committed by strangers. See id.
Frighteningly, almost half of the individuals who rape very young children are rela-
tives of the child. See id. The remaining 50% typically are friends or acquaintances
of the victim. See id.
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upon the most extreme cases that account for less than one
percent of sexual abuse and sexual crimes in America. Unfor-
tunately, these unique cases are often the catalyst and basis
for developing new legislation to address sexual abuse....
[M]isinformation compromises our ability to create laws that
will be effective in reducing sexual abuse.0 6
Such condemnation of the media, however, fails to recognize
that juvenile proceedings are not a matter of public record.
"Journalists... cannot cover the system in any on-going, com-
prehensive way because no one will talk to them except in the
most vague generalities."2 0  As a result, "mainstream journalists
frequently ignore the system until there is a catastrophe."2 8
Bound and gagged by juvenile confidentiality laws, journalists
resort to generalities and nearly incomprehensible figures 20 9 in
an attempt to draw a picture of "ordinary" child sexual abuse.210
The media's overemphasis on extreme cases is not solely re-
sponsible for perpetuating the image of a dangerous stranger
stereotype as the typical offender. Politicians have much to gain
by treating child sexual abuse as a crime perpetrated by myste-
rious, evil strangers with sordid criminal backgrounds. No one
wants a child to be molested, and convicted sexual offenders
generally exhibit a high rate of recidivism;2 11 therefore, politi-
cians may sponsor bills against sexual offenders that they know
will obtain popular approval. 12 It is easy for a politician to take
206. Freeman-Longo, supra note 17, at 311.
207. HUBNER & WOLFSON, supra note 179, at viii.
208. Id.
209. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
210. For an excellent first-hand account of the difficulties involved in obtaining
journalistic information from a juvenile court, see HUBNER & WOLFSON, supra note
179, at vii-xiii.
211. See Brief of Petitioner at 36 n.24, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997)
(Nos. 95-1649, 95-9075), available in 1996 WL 435941.
212. This is particularly true of community notification laws that require little com-
mitment of personal prestige or public resources to implement. See Mike Hudson,
Megan's Law Deceptive: Experts Say 'It Tends to Give People a False Sense of Safe-
ty,' ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWs, Jan. 25, 1998, at Al, available in 1998 WL
5896343. The low degree of political risk corresponding with the inflated public per-
ception of what such a limited law actually can accomplish has led one child advo-
cate to characterize Megan's laws as "'a bit of a flim-flam.'" Id. After the Hendricks
Court ruled that a sexually violent predator statute need not include a treatment
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the moral high ground and assert that he has done everything
possible to combat the nightmare of child sexual abuse while his
political opponents have refused to rush to the aid of potential
victims by adopting his proposals.2 " For example, one editorial
condemned Megan's laws as a "colossal waste of resources" be-
cause they "deflect[] attention from the real problem" that rela-
tively few sexual offenses against children are committed by
strangers.2 1 In a vehement response, the senator who sponsored
a community notification bill in the New York State legislature
stated that "[olne life saved is never a colossal waste of resourc-
es."215 The senator also blamed opposition to the bill on party
politics: "The Republican-controlled New York [S]tate Senate has
recently passed such a bill; and to no one's surprise, the Demo-
crat-controlled Assembly, unfortunately, has not."216 The senator
did not respond to the charge that community notification laws
obscure the more difficult reality that most sexual offenses are
committed by adults who their victims know and trust.2 17 Nor
provision in order to survive a constitutional challenge, see Hendricks, 521 U.S. at
365-68, such laws have become less expensive because funding need not be allocated
for treatment. As a result, such statutes can be expected to gain popularity. See,
e.g., Ben Z. Hershberg, Man Gett 70 Years for Molesting Children, COURIER-J. (Lou-
isville), Oct. 29, 1997, at B03, available in 1997 WL 6651727 (quoting one prosecutor
who obtained a 70-year prison term for a child molester: "Everybody would like to
see people like this behind bars for a thousand years.'"); Michael G. Planty & Louise
van der Does, Megan's Laws Aren't Enough, WALL ST. J., July 17, 1997, at A22 (ar-
guing in favor of sexually violent predator laws and stating that "[i]f a soon-to-be-re-
leased offender is deemed mentally abnormal and continues to exhibit violent sexual
behavior, please don't tell us he's moving in next door-tell us he'll be locked up
indefinitely").
213. Child sexual abuse is such a highly emotional issue that there is no need for
a politician to prove that his proposed solutions actually would be effective. See infra
notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
214. Planty & van der Does, supra note 212, at A22.
215. Dean G. Skelos, Letters to the Editor: Mark the Predators in Our Midst, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 12, 1997, at A15.
216. Id.
217. Only rarely do stories of respected community members who have been ac-
cused or convicted of child sexual abuse make the headlines. These articles typically
comment that it is hard to believe that such "normal" individuals could be child mo-
lesters. See, e.g., Audra Aug, Washington: Santa's Secret Stuns Community, DAYTON
DAILY NEWS, Nov. 16, 1997, at 2AA, available in 1997 WL 16061708 (describing a
community's reactions to the admissions of child molestation by a man who tradi-
tionally had played Santa Claus at the local mall); Stephen Hunt, Child Rapist
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did he address the fact that while "one life saved is never a co-
lossal waste of resources,"218 if used more effectively, those re-
sources might be able to save more than one life. Widespread
underreporting, the media, and political expediency therefore all
contribute to the perpetuation of child sexual abuse as a "silent
epidemic."219
"Expressive Justice": A Bar to Breaking the Silence
Although statistics are unreliable, they are sufficiently accu-
rate to reveal that child sexual abuse is a larger problem than is
generally acknowledged by the American public.2 ' Equally clear
is that the individuals who are most likely to molest children
are least likely to be affected by child sexual abuse preventive
legislation.22 ' Why have legislators and the courts continued to
focus upon what appears to be the periphery of a much larger
problem?
One reason is that in spite of the compelling rhetoric,222 sexual
violent predator and other similar laws are not designed primar-
ily to provide relief to the victim, nor to reduce the child sexual
abuse rate.2  If the laws truly were focused on the victim, they
Going to Jail for 30 Years, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 20, 1998, at B2, available in
1998 WL 4043827 (noting that a recently convicted violent sexual offender "seem[ed]
an unlikely candidate for child molester" because he was "[a] Vietnam War hero
active in Scouting and Little League ... [and was a] community leader"); Texas
Priest Sentenced to Life in Prison for Altar Boy Assaults, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1998,
at A18 (reporting the conviction of a parish priest).
218. Skelos, supra note 215, at A15.
219. See Freeman-Longo, supra note 17, at 303.
220. See supra notes 176-82 and accompanying text.
221. Legislation such as the Act targets the previously convicted dangerous strang-
er, yet 96% of rape victims under 12 years old are brutalized by relatives or others
they know. See supra note 205. Intrafamily sexual abuse is the least likely to be re-
ported. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. These cases, therefore, are the
least likely to lead to the prosecution and ultimate conviction of the perpetrator.
Sexual violent predator laws and Megan's laws therefore provide no assistance to the
children most in need of protection.
222. See, e.g., Pat Roberts, Kansas Delegation Signs Supreme Court Brief, Govern-
ment Press Releases, Aug. 21, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11124518 (quoting Kansas
State Representative, Todd Tiahrt: "Is there any higher right or responsibility a
society has than to protect our children? In this case I am glad to voice my support
for the children, of Kansas.").
223. See Levesque, supra note 170, at 83.
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would specifically allocate resources for therapy and counseling
or other measures to help the victim cope with the tragedy that
had occurred.2" If statutes covering child sexual abuse were
solely efforts to prevent child abuse, legislators would address
all aspects of the problem, and would not be content to pinpoint
the individuals who contribute the least to the problem propor-
tionately.
22 5
Similarly, despite the Supreme Court's deference to the pur-
ported civil purpose of the statute in Hendricks,2 6 sexual violent
predator laws are not designed as a method to provide psycho-
logical treatment to sexual offenders. If rehabilitation were the
objective of the legislation, sexual violent predator laws would
resemble traditional involuntary civil commitment legislation,
and treatment would be a central feature. 227 Although the
Hendricks Court was willing to accept the Kansas legislature's
characterization of the Act as civil in nature, the Act's legislative
history and the lack of treatment programs228 clearly demon-
strate that the mental health and well-being of sexual offenders
224. Some psychologists believe that the threat of criminal prosecution is insuffi-
cient to protect children from sexual abuse, therefore they have urged policymakers
to reconsider their approaches to protecting children. See, e.g., Freeman-Longo, supra
note 17, at 304 ([A] criminal justice model alone [which punishes but does not deter
behavior] is not preventing sexual abuse from occurring.... [We must address sex-
ual abuse as a multifaceted problem for which there is no singular or simple solu-
tion."); Levesque, supra note 170, at 84 ("The current child protection approach can
never truly be 'child-friendly' because it is predicated on the incorrect perception
that punishing offenders best serves children.").
225. The concern is that by restricting legislative efforts to offenders not known to
the victim, lawmakers ignore the fact that even more children are hurt by
unonpredators." Resources are limited, and expending funds almost entirely on laws
that safeguard against a proportionately minor number of cases takes money away
from programs that might address the core of the child sexual abuse problem.
226. See supra notes 149, 153-55, and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 23-33 and accompanying text.
228. The majority opinion recognized that "the treatment program initially offered
Hendricks may have seemed somewhat meager," but noted that "it must be remem-
bered that he was the first person committed under the Act." Kansas v. Hendricks,
521 U.S. 346, 367-68 (1997). The dissent, however, detailed precisely how "meager"
the provisions for treatment had been. "[A]s of the time of Hendricks' commitment,
the State had not funded treatment, it had not entered into treatment contracts,
and it had little, if any, qualified treatment staff. Indeed... Hendricks, according
to the commitment program's own director, was receiving 'essentially no treatment.'"
Id. at 384 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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were not the impetus for drafting the Act as is the case in tradi-
tional civil commitment laws.229
Sexual predator laws focus on society at large, rather than
upon any of the involved parties.230 Stunned and horrified by the
cases of child sexual abuse that receive the most extensive me-
dia coverage, communities clamor for a solution, and legislators
react by passing laws that are responsive to the media frenzy
but that are not necessarily effective.23 ' This phenomenon has
been called "expressive justice," and characterizes "laws, policies,
and practices that are designed more to vent communal outrage
than to reduce crime."
232
The interactive lawmaking described by the term "expressive
justice" does more than direct legislators' attention to certain is-
sues.233 It also permits them to avoid issues the public finds dis-
tasteful. Like Freud,2 4 "health professionals, relatives, and oth-
ers may have [difficulty] in accepting the possibility that parents
would deliberately abuse a child ... . Professionals and mem-
bers of the judiciary... may be almost unable to acknowledge
that such acts can be and are committed by apparently caring
mothers, fathers, and stepparents."215 Guilt also encourages
denial. One expert explained that sexual abuse "is a personal
violation, and parents are devastated when they learn that, in
229. See id. at 388-90 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
230. See Levesque, supra note 170, at 83 (arguing that prosecuting sex crimes "is
for society, not the child").
231. See ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 270-71.
232. Id. at 14.
233. For example, consider the role that Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD)
has played in focusing national attention on the need for more stringent prohibitions
against and penalties for drunk driving. See, e.g., Kevin McGill, MADD Tactics Fail
to Win War: Lawmakers are Touched, Put Off, NEW ORLEANS TIM S-PICAYUNE, Apr.
5, 1998, at B1, available in 1998 WL 6265781.
234. See supra note 178.
235. David P. Southall et al., Covert Video Recordings of Life-Threatening Child
Abuse: Lessons for Child Protection, PEDIATRICS, Nov. 1, 1997, at 735, 740. Although
this article by Southall and his colleagues discusses the use of covert video surveil-
lance to record instances of nonsexual abuse of children in England, this analysis
applies equally to cases of child sexual abuse. Cf Holt, supra note 191, at 1 (citing
child abuse experts who state that it is "extraordinarily difficult for parents to
square the act of sexually abusing a child with their perceptions of trusted, well-
known members of the community").
1464
PREVENTING CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
effect, they handed their child to a child molester. You'd rather
believe that you haven't done that."'2 6 Denial is an implicit im-
pediment to change. Legislatures pass expressive laws as a reac-
tion to public outcry.37 When there is widespread denial of a
problem, there is no outrage over its continued existence. Politi-
cians therefore have no impetus from the public to address the
larger problem of sexual abuse by "nonpredators," and they focus
their efforts, and the community's resources, on expressive laws
that spring from a reaction to a particularly extreme case.
It does not seem to matter that sexual predator laws actually
do little to arrest the particular problem. "[Hlorrific emotionally
charged headlines leave people with a sense of hopelessness and
helplessness in addressing the problem."28 "[Diemanding [cer-
tain laws] and voting for them give[s] people a way to feel as if
they are doing something, a way to handle fear."2 39 Handling our
collective terror by enacting ineffective laws does little to combat
the tide of child sexual abuse, yet it directly, and adversely, af-
fects the community. Such legislation vilifies certain criminals
so they have no hope of ever again becoming productive mem-
bers of society, thus forever placing the burden of supporting
those individuals on the community.2 4 It establishes a false
and misleading sense of security2 41 that encourages parents to
236. Holt, supra note 191, at 1 (quoting Lucy Berliner, Director of Research at the
Harborview Sexual Assault Center in Seattle, Washington).
237. See ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 14 (stating that expressive laws are designed
"to vent communal outrage").
238. Freeman-Longo, supra note 17, at 308.
239. ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 16.
240. Health care professionals acknowledge that individuals incarcerated under a
sexual violent predator law are unlikely to be released, despite the state's argument
that sexually violent predators would be granted periodic review and potential re-
lease-a characteristic that the State claimed made the Act distinct from a punitive
law. See Weilert, supra note 151, at 22. Given a psychiatrist's potential susceptibility
to civil liability if she releases a "former" sexually violent predator who subsequently
commits another sexual offense, experts doubt that any psychiatrist would be willing
to assume that magnitude of a responsibility. See id; see also ANDERSON, supra note
11, at 271 (questioning the proposition underlying the concept of expressive justice
that "evildoers are evil for life, that bad people may not be converted to good, [and]
that lost souls may never be reclaimed," and arguing that the expense of incarcerat-
ing an offender for life is a practical reason to hope for rehabilitation and eventual
reassimilation into society).
241. See Hudson, supra note 212, at Al.
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believe unknown predators pose the greatest threat to their
children's safety.2 42 This erroneous belief frequently prevents
parents from instilling necessary caution in their children. "Al-
though parents often warn children about stranger danger,
many fail to alert them to the danger that can exist within their
own families."243 Perhaps most importantly, expressive laws re-
move the sense of urgency that typically surrounds well-publi-
cized cases of child abuse. The compelling story is dropped from
the headlines, people return to their ordinary routines, and the
silent epidemic continues.2"
HENDRICKS AS IssuE AVOIDANCE: DEFINING THE PLAYING FIELD
TO AVOID THE LAND MINE OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS
In Hendricks, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to shift
the focus of child sexual abuse away from expressive laws that
attempt to confine the offender who is a stranger to the victim
but do nothing to remedy the more pervasive problem of known
offenders. By couching the argument on the semantic distinction
between criminality and civility, the Court did not address di-
rectly the inherent tension between the opposing parties' rights:
the liberty rights of an individual against the right of a child to
be free from harm. Performing linguistical and logical calisthen-
ics, the Court arrived at its conclusion while avoiding fundamen-
tal questions regarding the permissibility of legislative annihila-
tion of the constitutional rights of those confined under the Act.
In doing so, the Court squandered an opportunity to expand the
discussion of the child sexual abuse problem in America.
The Court was content to dismiss Hendricks's Ex Post Facto
and Double Jeopardy claims by applying labels to them. Accord-
242. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
243. Alma E. Hill, Child's Weapon Against Sex Abuse: 'No, Go, Tell': Safeguarding
Kids Crucial But Complicated, ATLANTA J. CONST., Jan. 26, 1998, at B03, available
in 1998 WL 3673878.
244. See supra notes 176-93 and accompanying text; see also Robert Hanley, Law
Signed Barring Parole of Child Molesters Who Kill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1997, at B4
(discussing implementation of a bill written in response to a rape and strangulation
incident that occurred in 1973, and stating that "[1]egislative officials said the ...
measure lingered in the Legislature for two years because passions about the 1973
murder had long since subsided").
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ing to the majority, these constitutional rights applied only to
criminal laws; the Act was civil. Superficially, it was an open
and shut case for the government. A different analytical ap-
proach, however, would have encouraged open debate regarding
child sexual abuse, perhaps paving the way for future, more ef-
fective, less expressive laws, and would have avoided trampling
principles of individual liberty.
Had the Court chosen to define the state's compelling interest
in overcoming Hendricks's constitutional claims as "preventing
child sexual abuse," the Court could have decided that sexual
violent predator laws address too small a percentage of child
sexual offenses to warrant the deprivation of an individual's con-
stitutional rights.245 Benefits of this approach would be twofold.
It would have served as the impetus, currently lacking in the
minds of the general public, to force legislators to reevaluate the
breadth of the child sexual abuse problem and the identity of its
perpetrators. The Court missed its opportunity to spur creative
thinking on the subject, and ultimately protect a greater number
of children from the peril of child sexual abuse.
Moreover, the Court could have ensured the protection of indi-
vidual constitutional liberties, rather than provide for their dete-
rioration. The Hendricks Court deferred to the Kansas legisla-
ture's choice of the words "mental abnormality," which enabled
the Court to circumvent protections that would have otherwise
been provided to Hendricks in the civil context.2" By refusing to
compel a legislature to have some basis for its classification, and
then deferring to that same body with respect to the purpose of
the statute, the Court in effect provided no review and paved the
way for future representatives to steamroll constitutional rights
with the most pretextual of justifications.
245. See Stovall, supra note 16, at 13 (providing statistics regarding the number of
individuals committed under the Act).
246. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 355-57 (1997).
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CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
In Hendricks, the Court appeared to be willing to sacrifice
individual liberty in return for public safety. The Court focused
its examination of involuntary civil commitment on the commu-
nity, rather than following the traditional analysis that centered
around the individual. One reason the Court may have been
willing to alter the focus of the inquiry in this case was because
of the state's duty to protect its children through its role as pa-
rens patriae.247 Hendricks may represent the Court's implicit
decision that the state has a greater duty to protect its children
than it does to safeguard the constitutional rights of an
adult-even one whom some psychiatrists might deem mentally
ill. The Court's conclusion might have protected a greater num-
ber of children from the horrors of child sexual abuse in the long
run if it had found the Act unconstitutional, thereby forcing
state legislatures to reexamine the problem and reevaluate their
current method of addressing that problem.
Hendricks appears to set the stage for courts and legislatures
to circumvent individual constitutional protections-both civil
and criminal-in the name of promoting public safety.248 The
Court's method of ensuring the "common good,"249 however, is
questionable. Once the legislative branch attacks individual
protections and the judicial branch sanctions the erosion of those
protections, it is difficult to reestablish those constitutional
rights in the future. As one of this country's founders warned
long before the concept of American independence had taken
247. Interestingly, the mentally ill generally are included within the mantle of the
parens patriae duty. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. The Hendricks Court
was willing to extend its protection to children, but was unwilling to be as sympa-
thetic to the "mentally abnormal," holding that exposing Hendricks to "meager"
treatment was sufficient to satisfy the State's duty to him. See Hendricks, 521 U.S.
at 367-68.
248. This trend is consistent with recent decisions regarding the Fourth Amend-
ment, in which public safety in general, and the safety of police officers in particu-
lar, has been the justification for extremely broad searches and seizures. See, e.g.,
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1051 (1983) (extending the doctrine of Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), to permit protective sweeps of areas to prevent a person
from gaining control of a weapon and threatening the police officers and the public-
at-large).
249. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905).
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root, "They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little
temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety."
250
Cynthia A. King
250. Benjamin Franklin, Historical Review of Pennsylvania, in FAMILIAR QUOTA-
TIONS, 348:2 (Emily Morison Beck ed., 1980) (1759).
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